Paran Balakrishnan: Islamabad's 9/11 bonanza

MY WORD!

Last week in Washington, the 9/11 Commission delivered its blockbuster 567-page report, hailed as a magnum opus of legislative fact-finding. It offers India cold comfort and plenty of joy to Pakistan. From pages 367""369, the Commission praised General Pervez Musharraf and suggested the US should back the Pakistanis to the hilt "for years to come".

On July 20, Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, backed by top bureaucrats, arrived in Islamabad for the Saarc meet. They held intensive talks with their Pakistani counterparts. The trip's highlight was a meeting with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf.

Even though the meeting ran overtime, the Indians fast sensed the bonhomie had dried up. Musharraf's post-talks statement stressed the need for a time-frame on Kashmir. India's riposte was that it was too early for a rigid schedule. India also said it was "disappointed at the tone and substance of some of the comments made".

Why have the Pakistanis turned less friendly? Is it because Musharraf believes only Vajpayee has the stature to push through a Kashmir settlement? Perhaps he doesn't think the Manmohan Singh-Sonia Gandhi combo has the clout to deliver the goods.

Alternatively, are the Pakistanis acting tough in a bid to establish their hard-nosed negotiating credentials with a new government? Or is it the Pakistanis feel they've been let off the hook by the 9/11 Report? If, as the report states, Pakistan is a key element in the war against terror, then India can't do much about it.

What does the 9/11 Commission say about Pakistan? Crucially, it says the battle against Al Qaeda can't be fought without the Pakistanis. "It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism," it states unambiguously.

It begins by describing Pakistan in less than flattering terms: "Pakistan's endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment." The report then outlines America's past differences with Pakistan. Most importantly, Islamabad backed the Taliban and was desperate to keep them in power even after the Americans vowed to oust them. If that isn't bad enough, there's also nuclear proliferation. Pakistan "has claimed not to have known one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed."

That all sounds damning. But the report then outlines how""in its view""Pakistan has thrown in its lot with the US and deserves its loyalty. "Confronted by the United States with a stark choice, Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the US-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime."

Only two weeks ago, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage toured the subcontinent and chastised Islamabad for failing to shut down terrorist camps operating against India. But the report outlines approvingly how""from the US point of view""Pakistan is an ally against terror. "In 2004, it is clear the Pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against Islamist terrorists."

The report notes Islamabad has constantly complained the US is a fair weather friend. "The constant refrain of Pakistanis is that the United States long treated them as allies of convenience. As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises it is prepared to keep, for years to come."

What should those promises be? The report's recommendations will probably dash all India's hopes of US even-handedness in the region. "If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan."

"Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education."

There are several rounds of Indo-Pak negotiations in August, followed by a foreign ministers' meeting in September. It shouldn't be a surprise if, as we head to the negotiating table, we suddenly find Islamabad less willing to compromise.