Indira Gandhi began the politicisation of the institutions of governance: the judiciary, civil service, police and even intelligence apparatus were prime examples. She also tried to muzzle the press, limit if not eliminate inner-party democracy (by ending elections to the posts of office-bearers), and appointed tired party hacks as state governors. The general aim was to ensure that nothing would stand in the way of the leader of the government, if he or she was hell-bent on a course of action—whether it was placing a state under President’s rule or anything else. Many other politicians have seen the short-term advantages of this course and followed in her footsteps. Most civil servants in the states are now allied with one party or politician or another, which explains the mass transfers that take place in states when a new government comes into office.
Fortunately, it has not been a one-way street, for there has also been movement in the opposite direction, with new institutional mechanisms being worked out to put up defences. The selection of judges is an issue on which governments cannot unilaterally decide. Various commissions (like those on human rights and minorities) have been created that can provide a view that is independent of the government of the day (important when something like the Gujarat riots happens). Parliament itself has devoted itself to more committee work, which happens in a less partisan manner, without the need for grandstanding in front of a watching media. Judges have played their part by building up case law (for instance, on the legality of the dismissal of a state government) and by encouraging public interest litigation. The law on the right to information has been an important landmark, ombudsmen have been set up, and civil society has produced more effective watchdogs. But some correctives have been ineffective—like the various moves to stop the mass transfers of officials by stipulating minimum tenures.
Still, the general consensus would be that the government of the day has far too much influence over supposedly independent organisations that are expected to exercise their professional judgment without being influenced by the political executive of the day. In this context, it would be hard to find an organisation more in need of an image boost than the Central Bureau of Investigation, or CBI. Set up as an elite force, it has more or less completely given in to political pressures—with the comprehensive botching up (accompanied by sundry twists and turns) of the Quattrocchi case being a good example. It is not the only one. Whether it is the investigation into the roles of Jagdish Tytler and Sajjan Kumar in the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, or the off-on investigation into cases against Mulayam Singh Yadav and Mayawati, the heavy hand of political manipulation is there for all but the deliberately blind to see. Depending on individual perspective, one or other case may seem particularly outrageous, but the general lack of organisational credibility is beyond dispute. The government may plead that it has no hand in what the Bureau does, but this simply does not wash. This newspaper has argued repeatedly that the CBI has to be given institutional autonomy. There are many ways of doing this, all that is required is for the government to decide that such autonomy is required.
