In the last five weeks, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has interacted with heads of state of three important countries, Japan, China and the United States. He has visited two of them and hosted a third. There have been promises of substantial economic investment by Japan and China. In the US, the prime minister has been feted by the segment of Indian-Americans whose sympathies lie with him personally; but, at the governmental level, short of the usual rhetoric and proposals for cooperation that have already been on offer, there is not much to talk about. That notwithstanding, there can be no denying that India's prime minister has come out as a strong person with whom these countries can do business. A fourth summit, with an equally important country, Russia, is to follow.
The range of issues discussed between the dramatis personae in these visits has been wide-ranging. My focus is on India's security scenario, and the role and involvement of each of these players in it.
Clearly, our interface with China is at the top of this list. That country has been an adversary in a full-fledged military conflict with us, occupies several thousand square kilometres of land which is rightly ours, engages closely and proactively with a neighbour whose hostility towards this country needs no reiteration. The Chinese have challenged us through boundary incursions repeatedly, most recently in sync with the visit of President Xi Jinping.
India's desire to have the boundaries clearly defined is matched by the Chinese wish to continue with the status quo, which allows them to use the undemarcated border as leverage, which they have done more than once. China is now deploying submarines in the Indian Ocean and seeks to enhance its naval presence through overtures to littorals in the form of a Maritime Silk Route. Its military budget is more than four times that of India. These are not facts that an Indian government, of whatever hue, can afford to gloss over, all other issues regardless. So, any political strategy that does not recognise this ground reality is certain to act to our disadvantage. In short, even as economic and political, even military, engagement with China should figure in India's security calculus, there have to be to some fall-back positions built into it. For these to be meaningful, interactions with other players become necessary.
The US is one such. Frankly, it has not much in common with Indian interests, protestations of being the largest and oldest democracies regardless. It is a global power with related aspirations in which its own pre-eminence is the first prerequisite. Its involvement with India is primarily to further the interests of its own businesses and to have us on its 'side'. Whether on climate change issues or on economic policies like the Trans Pacific Partnership, or in trade-related matters, its priorities are not the same as our own. It has difficulties with our stand on Intellectual Property Rights and on subsidies; our geopolitical approaches in Iran, Afghanistan and West Asia are unlikely to converge. Yet, in the context of our relations with China, close engagement with the US gives us the leverage that no other interface can; for the first time, both countries have referred to their mutual concerns in the South China Sea. It is on security issues, therefore, that India and the US have the greatest synergies and it is not surprising that these are the areas in which maximum progress has been made in the last decade and will most likely be made in the years to come. Extension of the 10-year Framework of Defence Cooperation agreement concluded in 2005 is, therefore, to be welcomed.
Russia falls in a category of its own. It has no territorial issues with India and has been its most reliable supplier of defence hardware for close to five decades. At difficult times, as in 1971, it has stood in our support. It has played and is playing a significant role in this country's military modernisation. After decades of fairly insipid relations with India, Japan is now realising the important part that we can play in ensuring the safety of its long and exposed energy lifeline as it traverses from the Gulf across the waters of the Indian Ocean. It also sees this country as a positive player in the context of its equations with China. Japan's security policies are no longer just tied to the US, and India is increasingly being seen as a useful partner. The reverse is also true, as relations with Japan impact India's interfaces with China and its concerns in the Indo-Pacific.
In short, positive interfaces with the US, Russia and Japan are linked to India's security interests. It is desirable that these be further developed and defence cooperation can play a very important role in this process. While exchanges of personnel, joint exercises, maritime security cooperation, mechanisms for regular high-level engagement between the military and political leaderships et al have their own importance, there is need to supplement these with procurement of military hardware and technology transfers that can enhance our own indigenous capabilities. Acquisition of important weapons and strategic platforms must, therefore, be more than mere commercial transactions but also factor in the larger strategic interface for political gain.
Adopting the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route with American companies - as done for P8I, C17 and C130J aircraft - avoids arduous processes as seen in the multi-role fighter aircraft deal which remains in limbo despite several years of trials, testing, selection and negotiations. Similarly, interactions with Russia are largely with government agencies. Such direct one-to-one dealings not only facilitate swift conclusion of contracts but avoid the vendor jealousies and charges of corruption which have successfully stymied more than one project. Technology transfers from both countries are now more easily available as seen in the joint development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft with the Russians and the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative offered by the Americans under which development and co-production of major weapon systems will be covered. Japan is a late entrant in this field through its offer of the US-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and the deal must be finalised speedily. In all these areas, quick and positive decisions are necessary.
Fortunately, unlike in other areas where contentious issues will continue to sometimes bedevil both bilateral and multilateral interactions, those focusing on security can act as catalysts towards closer relationships and defence cooperation and counterterrorism must lead the way. That is clearly the road to take.
The writer has been a member of the National Security Advisory Board and a participant in Track-II interactions with the US, China and Japan
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