Media reports indicate that India and the United States have “finalised” an agreement through which India will be recognised as a “major defence partner” of the US. It is not clear if a document to this effect has actually been signed, or its exact provisions. The qualitatitive differences between this arrangement and what the Americans already have with Pakistan — labelled a “major non-Nato ally” — are also not known.
Anyhow, there has been progressive enhancement of the engagement between India and the US since the first Memorandum of Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1995. There is a much more proactive US stance on transfer of military technology, leave aside almost $15 billion worth of purchases. Why is all this happening and to what purpose?
For the first 15 years after Independence, India's only military relationship was with the United Kingdom, a natural outflow of the colonial background. Almost all our military platforms, ships, aircraft and tanks came from the erstwhile “mother country”, other than a few which were acquired from France.
All this changed after the India-China war of 1962. For some reason, the British attitude was ambivalent at best, and they were reluctant to supply major platforms such as submarines. Thereafter, even though the relationship did not peter out and platforms such as INS Viraat and Sea Harrier aircraft were acquired, as also Sea King helicopters and Jaguars, it has diminished greatly.
Starting in the mid-1960s, a new defence relationship began — with the erstwhile Soviet Union. Unlike the US and UK, it readily agreed to supply submarines, missile ships and MiG aircraft. That country had started having problems with China and saw India as a potentially useful leverage. This military relationship has continued. In 1971, the two countries signed a treaty which facilitated India’s intervention in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. This interface has not dwindled even after 1991, when a truncated Russia replaced the Soviet Union.
Military platforms such as ships, aircraft and armoured vehicles have flowed, many with licensed production in India and upgrades. The icing on the cake has been the lease of two nuclear submarines and the assistance provided in the execution of our own indigenous nuclear submarines. Add to this list France and Israel, from where Mirage and now Rafale aircraft have been or are being acquired from the former and sophisticated airborne early warning and air defence systems from the latter, and the picture becomes more complete.
How does all this happen? Is it just acquisition of hardware, or is there something more to it? The first years were arguably just a continuation of what was already ongoing, but the subsequent years were clearly different. For example, even though the interface with the Russians was almost entirely based on procurement of hardware, it did involve transfer of significant technologies. Similarly, while that with the Americans and others has revolved around acquisition of platforms and systems, it has involved military-military cooperation, joint exercises, port visits and so on.
This element was initially lacking with the Soviet Union but has gathered some momentum in the last decade. With Israel also, the defence engagement has come about only as a result of some course correction over earlier years. So, synergy with foreign policy has to be an important element of a country’s defence policies and vice versa. It will be interesting to see how India has gravitated to this environment given its historic inclination for non-alignment.
In the last 10-15 years, we have entered into defence cooperation agreements with nearly 40 countries. With some, the interface is limited and with others it is growing, but the bottom line is that it helps create a mutually advantageous climate.
Unlike other forms of engagement such as trade agreements which involve both give and take, military cooperation has no such complexity. For this reason alone, it must be seen as a very useful tool for promoting foreign policy objectives. It can also be done gradually, without linking it to traditional conflict scenarios. In the emerging security environment in which non-traditional threats are acquiring greater significance, military cooperation must become a key element of diplomacy.
While India has made major strides in linking diplomacy with defence policy, there are weaknesses, too. First, we are non-existent in the provision of military hardware, not because we do not wish to, but because we lack the capability. Our defence production infrastructure is not geared to meeting even our own requirements, much less those of others, and the private sector is still nowhere in the picture. We must create capacities in private companies to manufacture at least the basic platforms and systems, to start with. The recent contract for the foreign collaborator to do this in respect of M77 howitzers with Mahindra is a step in the right direction. Without hardware, defence cooperation can never acquire the desired impetus.
The second weakness is insufficient integration between those who practise diplomacy and those in the military. There must be institutionalised arrangements in place for this to happen. Third, we must evolve a comprehensive national security strategy in which all these subsets and priorities will be put in place. To paraphrase Clausewitz, defence cooperation is policy “by other means”. We have moved far away from the mindsets of the earlier decades, but there are still miles to go.
The writer is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has also served as member of the National Security Advisory Board
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
