Relying only on domestic shipyards to supply its needs will not work if India wants its Navy to expand instead of shrinking as it is now.
Several pieces have been written in recent times, some in this newspaper, about the Indian Navy’s ambitious ship acquisition plans, mainly by building them within the country. All three defence shipyards — Mazagon Docks in Mumbai (MDL), Garden Reach Shipbuilders (GRSE) in Kolkata and Goa Shipyard (GSL) in Goa — have their order books quite full. The old adage that navies build ships, not buy them, is equally true and due credit must be given to Navy planners over the years for following this dictum. Despite constraints in financial resources for the Armed Forces in general, the Navy and its shipbuilding plans in particular, have never been seriously constrained. Logically, therefore, the picture should be very bright. Unfortunately, this is not so.
Until the 1970s, all major warships were bought abroad, till the mid-1960s from the UK and thereafter from then Soviet Union (USSR). Through the ’70s, the Navy operated an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and 17 frigates and destroyers. The last two categories, quite different in their sizes and roles in earlier years, are now about the same and can be treated as one. It was realised that many of the 17 would need to be sent to the scrapyard. Thus, a programme to build frigates at the MDL, in collaboration with the UK, was initiated. In 1980, six new ships were delivered, but at the same time, nine of the older counterparts had to be phased out, so force levels were still short of where they were at the start of the decade. The 1980s saw outright purchase of five destroyers from the USSR and building of three frigates in India, making a total of eight. In this same time-frame, the Navy lost eight frigates, five due to old age and three to the fledgling Coast Guard, so at the end, force levels were no better than what they were two decades ago.
In the 1990s, two destroyers and three frigates were inducted. Alarm at dwindling forces led to only two older units being scrapped when more merited that sad end. So, there was a marginal increase. As things stand, the Navy has four frigates (1970s), five destroyers and three frigates (1980s), three destroyers and three frigates built indigenously and three purchased from the USSR, all quite new, making for a total of 21 frigates/destroyers. If one takes into account the two cruisers that were not replaced, the force level has not changed in more than three decades.
The picture in regard to submarines is dismal. From having none till the mid-1960s, we moved to four by the end of that decade and to eight in the 1970s. Eight more were added in the 1980s; six more came in the 1990s. Allowing for some which were scrapped, the Navy operated 18 submarines in the 1990s. Then came catastrophe; the programme for continued building of submarines in India, modifying the German HDW design, fell flat as politics of alleged corruption took over. No one corrupt has been identified till today but the building of submarines has remained halted for fifteen years. Not surprisingly, many older submarines have gone and no more than 14 remain; by the time the six French design Scorpenes currently being built at MDL are delivered, hopefully by 2020, at least eight of the earlier boats acquired in the 1980s would have gone to the pyre. Not even our worst enemy could have inflicted such punishment on us. Ordering more submarines on MDL can only help in the post-2020 time-frame.
This is the context in which shipbuilding and acquisition plans must be viewed. At no time, not even the best, has MDL been able to deliver more than one frigate/destroyer in eighteen months; so, one can, at best, expect to see the three destroyers and three Project 17 ships on order being delivered in the next eleven years. In the same period, a dozen ships (1970s and 1980s) will need to be phased out. The Navy has ordered three ships from Russia which will arrive in the 2011-15 period and this will ensure that force levels do not fall; the possibility of an increase is distant.
In the mid-1980s, it was learnt that MDL alone would not be able to meet the Navy’s needs of frigates and destroyers. Accordingly, the Navy decided to develop the GRSE into a second production line for such ships. Unfortunately, the work languished for years, not entirely due to that yard’s inadequacies. This distressed the user and no further orders were given to this yard — this was possibly the one flaw in an otherwise consistent approach to developing indigenous capabilities. There are now plans to order seven frigates of Project 17A on both MDL and GRSE. This is a welcome correction as two production lines are essential to meet and sustain the required force levels but even this will not solve the problem.
The approach must be to “buy and build”. Two or three can be bought and the rest built indigenously. This will have several benefits. One, the induction of ships being bought will be faster; two, absorption of modular construction technology will be easier and faster, especially for GRSE; and three, production schedules in the two yards will be better. Ordering all of them on our two yards will not be wise. Building all ships indigenously may sound patriotic but is immature; it glosses over ground realities and acts against the nation’s interests.
The same pragmatic approach is needed in regard to submarines. A second production line is essential. Building these vessels is a very complex and sophisticated activity which requires high degree of skills that are not easily available. A ‘buy and build’ approach is even more necessary to give time to set up a qualified workforce and to ensure that technology is absorbed quickly, but without compromising on the high standards imperative for such ships. A suitable yard must be identified quickly and then developed.
Building force levels in navies that are already of a certain size is no easy task. In 1980, faced by a reducing US Navy fleet, then numbering 350-odd ships, then President Ronald Reagan directed that a 600-ship Navy must be put in place in the next 10-15 years. Nearly three decades later, the US Navy is not anywhere near that magical figure and at 289 vessels, is below even the force level of that time. There are plans to take it up to 329 ships in the next ten years but that might be impossible. Against the $11 billion spent annually on construction of new ships, the country would need to spend $21 billion if that figure was to be reached, a highly unlikely prospect given the economic downturn in that country.
In our own country, there is yet another aspect that needs to be recognised. Rough analysis will show that the revenue:capital expenditure relationship of 65:35, as prevalent in India, will just about keep existing strengths in place. The share of capital must increase if there is to be enhancement. Despite repeated efforts, we are unable to change this proportion. Naval aviation is, fortunately, beginning to look up. Induction of eight P8I long-range surveillance aircraft from the US will make up a serious shortcoming but this number is not enough; at least 12 and, possibly, 16 such platforms are needed. Induction of MIG 29K aeroplanes, to operate from the new aircraft carrier, will also add some muscle.
In short, if the country requires a Navy of a kind which can safeguard its interests in the emerging security environment around us, plans must be developed and then executed with pragmatism, exploiting and enhancing indigenous capabilities and, at the same time, taking short cuts of advantage, by utilising capacities elsewhere. Purchase of ships and submarines is not cheap by any measure; the investment must get suitable returns. By placing orders abroad, we enable those countries to give work to their own yards and provide employment to their people. These must, and will, lead to some quid pro quo. The need of the hour is to look at things holistically and not in compartments.
The author is a former Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command
