Gwadar, a port in western Pakistan in the news recently, has been developed through Chinese assistance worth $200 million. The work must have involved dredging to some reasonable depth (not less than 12 metres) and building container terminals as well as associated facilities such as cranes, warehouses, etc. Reports indicate that some specifically naval infrastructure has also been built. Management of this fledgling port was outsourced to a Singapore company, but has reportedly run into some trouble. There have been issues regarding transfer of land by naval authorities and the company has sought to withdraw from the agreement. It is not unusual for countries that lack the required managerial know-how to outsource management of ports to foreign agencies proficient in such work. Approval has now been accorded, although “in principle”, to a company from China, Chinese Overseas Port Holdings, to replace the Singapore firm. Apparently, the Chinese dithered for more than a year before coming on board; and it may take some more time before things actually begin to move on the ground. The port’s operations have reportedly been languishing, and the new arrangement is expected to give fresh impetus to the project.
Inevitably, this impending change of management in Gwadar, along with port development in some other Indian Ocean littorals through Chinese aid – Sri Lanka and Myanmar, to name two – has revived talk of the hackneyed term “String of Pearls”. The suggestion is that these assisted projects will, in due course, lead to comprehensive naval facilities, which China might be allowed to use for its forward naval presence and operations in the Indian Ocean. The corollary of this assumption is that the countries benefiting from such assistance will happily allow more or less permanent location of Chinese naval and aviation assets – the two are linked – in their territories.
The ground realities are not so simplistic. Development of major ports from the ordinary fishing harbours that these villages were is no easy task; it involves creation of a range of complex infrastructure apart from ensuring placid and calm waters. Neither Gwadar nor any of the other two ports are naturally protected bays; not only do they require considerable dredging to provide the type of depths that will permit large merchant ships and oil tankers to come and go but also physical protection, known as breakwaters, without which the necessary tranquillity of water cannot be ensured. It was only after full and careful technical examination of the pros and cons that India had decided against bidding for Hambantota port development project in Sri Lanka. The Chinese came in for different reasons but will find, in due course, just as the Sri Lankans will, that creation of a viable major facility there is easier said than done. Much the same can be said of Gwadar.
That aside, putting Gwadar to any meaningful use will require linking the port to the hinterland through a comprehensive road and rail network. Neither is in place yet. Also, considering that almost all of it will have to pass through troubled Balochistan, where some Chinese engineers were killed some time ago, the task will not be easy. Bringing in oil and gas tankers from the Gulf to Gwadar and taking their supplies through long land pipelines running over Baloch-dominated areas to Xinjiang and beyond – thus overcoming the vulnerabilities of movement through the restricted channels of Southeast Asia – is not as easy as it looks.
Yes, the naval facilities created in Gwadar can reduce – but only partly – Pakistan’s dependence on their one major base at Karachi, which was raided twice in 1971 by Indian naval ships with devastating results. But to expect that this port can be developed into an equivalent naval base is clearly unrealistic, given some of the difficulties already highlighted. In any event, Gwadar can only serve as a diversionary port to which the Pakistan navy’s ships may retreat to put maximum distance between them and our own. It can be argued that, once based at Gwadar, they will be better placed to interdict India’s incoming supplies from the Gulf. But anyone in Pakistan would know that in any confrontation that country could only come off second best.
This brings us to the seminal thesis that China could be offered naval facilities in Gwadar to maintain a much more credible presence in the Indian Ocean than it currently has. Mere port visit and replenishment will not help; repair and logistics facilities must be comprehensive; and the ability to base, operate and repair ships and aircraft is a key necessity. As for the crews’ recreation, Gwadar is not only a poor choice but could even be hazardous; there are ports in the Gulf that are already open to the Chinese ships that offer better value for money without risks to life.
The Chinese are also aware that even if such base facilities came their way in Gwadar, these would not enable them to overcome the asymmetries that they face in the Indian Ocean vis-a-vis India. If the Chinese are to mount any kind of offensive actions against us in this ocean space, it would require a military alliance with Pakistan. There are, however, no indications that they are willing to do this anytime soon or even consider it to be consistent with their core interests. To the contrary, the Chinese are fully cognisant of India’s strengths in the Indian Ocean and of its ability to provide safety of the sea commons; recent overtures to interact with us on maritime security co-operation reflect that thinking.
Finally, to think that Sri Lanka or Myanmar, even Pakistan, can or will permit basing of foreign military units on their soil is to show ignorance of today’s realities. First, any sense that the first two could easily ignore or brush aside India’s security concerns given their linkages is naïve. As for Pakistan, any expectation that countries of the Persian Gulf – Iran and Saudi Arabia, for instance – will be happy to have such presence on their doorsteps is facile. How the Americans would view this development were it to come about is another matter; credible Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, with bases strung around, is not something that will be music to Washington’s ears.
We should not fall into the trap of seeing a Chinese dragon in everything that they do, involving Pakistan or not. China is not an uninitiated novice in the world of international relations. If one of its companies comes in to operate Gwadar port, good luck to it. There is little reason to lose sleep; Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean are diplomatic and require a similar response even as we keep our weather eye open.
The writer has served on the National Security Advisory Board
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
