Some critical determinants in India's long-term security interests may not have received the attention they deserve, possibly because they have stretched over a period of time. Almost all of them are related to the sea. Last year a typhoon-class nuclear submarine, now INS Chakra, was inducted into the Indian Navy. This vessel, capable of operating when submerged and at high speeds for prolonged periods, gives a conventional capability at sea unmatched in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) by any other littoral.
Earlier this year, in August, the reactor of the Indian-built nuclear submarine INS Arihant, went "critical" - the penultimate stage in the operational readiness of the ship. Initially, it will carry, in its armoury, nuclear warhead missiles of limited range but these will be followed by those that can travel long distances, thus completing the third and most potent leg of India's nuclear triad. A second vessel of this type is under construction with another to follow. Around this same time, the Navy has begun to induct the US-manufactured P-8 long-range anti-submarine and surveillance aircraft which, given their endurance, sophisticated sensors and weapons, are adding a new dimension to the coverage of the IOR.
The first Indian-built aircraft carrier [INS Vikrant] was launched at Kochi some months ago and INS Vikramaditya, another warship of this type, acquired from Russia, has been commissioned and is on its way home. Both will embark a range of aircraft, principally the multi-role MiG-29K, also inducted during the last year, and operating from the naval air station INS Hansa at Goa. An indigenous satellite dedicated to the surveillance of the IOR is up in the air. Add to this list, the first of the three latest 6,500-tonne destroyers, INS Kolkata, being completed at Mazagon Dock Ltd in Mumbai and slated to be commissioned early next year.
To follow, in the years to come, will be the indigenously-built Scorpene-class submarines, more P-8 aircraft, the naval versions of the Tejas fighters being built at Bangalore, multi-purpose helicopters being acquired for ships as also unmanned vehicles. Add to this, the reach now available through the C-17 and C-130J aircraft being acquired by the Indian Air Force, and the spread and versatility of the modernisation becomes clear.
Not surprisingly, the Navy's share of the defence budget has risen from just over Rs 1,100 crore in the mid 1980s to Rs 36,000 crore in 2013-14, from 10 per cent of the overall cake to over 18 per cent. In this period, as total allocation for defence has increased 16 times from Rs 13,000 crore to just over Rs 2,00,000 crore, the Navy's share has increased 33 times. This is clear recognition that the country's security interests are increasingly getting focused seawards. While traditional threats on the land borders remain, these are significantly reduced. The possibility of war with Pakistan is remote; should it come about that country is likely to be the worse for it. As for China, there might still be the occasional border incident to send us in a flurry, but given its larger goal of becoming a global power on a par with the US, it seems unlikely that China will seek any serious military confrontation with India. Further, any such venture will see India seeking closer accommodation with the Americans, and that is the last thing the Chinese may wish quite aside from the fact that their energy lifeline running across the IOR will become exposed. Recent developments and interactions point to a nuanced change in China's posture regarding India. All things considered, the real security concerns are from asymmetric actions such as terrorism, aided or abetted by Pakistan. These are not less serious but our capabilities to deal with them have also become more credible. This leaves issues of internal stability and communal and social harmony, all of which are not unrelated and for which measures more than mere use of force are needed.
The critical element in India's aspirations in the years to come is sustained and inclusive economic growth. While some of its subsets have been mentioned above, unhindered supply of energy and free movement of commerce, both incoming and outgoing, are two very important essentials; both are predominantly connected to the sea. With dependence on energy imports increasing with every passing year and likely to reach as much as 80 per cent by 2020, its safe movement across the seas to our ports is important. The same is the case with overseas trade, which is growing and is expected to cross $850 billion in this financial year. If these two are adversely affected in any way, the impact on economic growth is easily imagined. Ensuring the safety of the sea lanes through which both move, especially in the IOR, is as much India's direct concern as its responsibility as the most credible littoral power in this part of the world. Add to this our duty to come to the assistance of countries and people affected by natural disasters that visit the IOR more often than they do any other part of the world - the Tsunami of 2004 being one example.
With the focus of global security concerns now having clearly shifted to the Asia-Pacific - some term it, correctly as the Indo-Pacific given that the seas are related to them in some way or the other - India has to engage itself more proactively in the IOR and, given the emerging geopolitical scenario, credible capabilities at sea are a prerequisite to play this role.
Co-operation, as distinct from military alliance, must be an important element of this strategy. It is not surprising, therefore, that India has defence co-operation agreements with nearly 40 countries, both littoral to the IOR and those beyond. These are not structured to meet traditional nation state threats - where we stand on our own - but to counter non-traditional concerns arising from piracy, terrorism and other criminal activities at sea. The exchange of information and intelligence is a vital necessity for which mutual trust and confidence in each other's capabilities and intentions is essential. This can only be generated through continuing engagement with joint exercises, exchange of personnel, visits of ships and delegations et al. For understandable reasons, navies are best placed to meet these needs and the Indian Navy has to be actively deployed in this task in concert with the country's diplomacy. And while there has been noticeable synergy between these two arms of the government in recent years, there is room for further enhancement. There have been complaints about India's "sea-blindness" in earlier years; those days seem to be getting behind us.
The author retired as commander-in-chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He has also been a member in the National Security Advisory Board
Disclaimer: These are personal views of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect the opinion of www.business-standard.com or the Business Standard newspaper
