Home Secretary G K Pillai shares with Aditi Phadnis the current thinking in the government on internal security.
The home ministry has proposed use of armed forces against the Naxalites. The government has not agreed to this. Instead, you’re now going to set up training units under ex-armymen to train policemen.
Let me explain the background. The discussion (on use of armed forces) was initiated as there was a shortage of manpower and we wanted to force the pace of offensive operations.
Rashtriya Rifles and Special Operations Forces were sought. But the home ministry made a proposal. It was discussed and there was a consensus in the government that armed forces should not be used. In any case, in the long term, it is better to strengthen special police officer, (SPO) and paramilitary forces.
So, we are sending a revised proposal, possibly next week, that chief ministers of Naxal-affected states be called to the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security so that their suggestions on strengthening police and paramilitary forces can be sought.
Now that the view in the government has crystallised — and it is clear that armed forces will not be used against Left Wing Extremism (LWE) — we will put into operation new ideas about recruitment and training of special police officers (former Naxalites who have turned against them) and paramilitary forces.
There are two levels of decisions we have to take. The first is about hardware, communications equipment, weapons and manpower shortages. The second is about training, as you can keep on recruiting, but if you don’t have training capabilities, what is the point of recruiting?
This is important because training facilities are not set up in a day. Right now, we are recruiting 19,000 boys in the Border Security Force every year. But because the same number retires each year, this doesn’t augment the force. We need to increase the training capacity and this can happen only in the next three to seven years. We can’t wait that long.
SPOs can be given four to six months training and launched in the field. They can be the eyes and ears of the local police. If every police station in the Bastar region has 10-20 SPOs, it will be of enormous help.
We’re also seeking help from ex-armymen, mainly engineers or sappers, to teach these boys de-mining techniques. We can have teams in every police station, with sappers leading the de-mining units.
This is just one part of the problem. The second is addressing development issues. The home ministry does not have the expertise to build roads and bridges. So, we’re talking to the Planning Commission.
The third part is to address the fears and suspicions of the tribal population. This is crucial, for it is this on which LWE feeds. So, issues like the forest rights legislation and land acquisition have to be addressed. All this will give confidence to tribals that the state is not against their interests.
Take the North-East. The tribals there continue to hold their land. No tribal in the North-East says there has been encroachment on his land. So, the 6th Schedule of the Constitution gave the North-East a measure of protection that the 5th Schedule didn’t.
Does that mean there is going to be no POSCO, that other industrial projects in tribal areas are going to be stopped ?
I didn’t say that. Let me give you an example. There is a huge uproar over bauxite mining near Visakhapatnam. If we allow the agitation to fester and carry on, we will be creating a new problem. If the protests of those who are agitating are genuine, we must stop bauxite mining. But if all that the tribal fears is — am I going to lose my land, am I going to be forced out of the area with no job — then we have to address the fear immediately, especially if it is unfounded.
If we want POSCO, we must tell the people they will get extra compensation, they will be partners in the project and get 25 per cent returns every year. What’s the problem?
In India, there is an agitation industry. In POSCO, for instance, members of all political parties have bought land around the plant site, hoping that if the agitation against the plant is successful and compensation is increased, they will double or triple their money. We need a policy framework that enables us to take quick decisions on these issues.
There are other instances. In Manipur, Naga students have blockaded the two national highways leading to Imphal. I’m told that traders brought large quantities of goods into Manipur about a month before the blockade and encouraged students to impose the blockade. What they bought for Rs 15 two months ago is selling for Rs 60. I am studying this. If I find this is true, they are going to have to explain.
A team has just returned after interrogating David Headley. He may have named some of his handlers in Pakistan. Is there anything India can realistically do to get these men?
The phrase ‘trust deficit’ is hackneyed but it describes best the state of the relationship. We will have to see the kind of talks the home minister has when he goes for the Saarc meeting. We tried our best to get them to give us matching voice samples to identify the handlers involved in 26/11. Their position seemed to be: ‘Why should we help you ?’
In contrast, Bangladesh has helped a lot. We’ve given them information and they have caught the people and given them to us. We can’t really stop cross-border infiltration from Pakistan. But on non-state actors, we’ve been telling them, either take action against these people or hand them over to us.
And the result is?
We’re now getting very gentle hints that the civilian government might help or at least, not impede, our inquiries. I don’t want to say anything more.
Something that is of great concern to civil society in India is the rise of Hindu terror. Is this something we should be alarmed about?
It is still amateurish. The orientation is, Muslims are hitting us, so we have to respond. But this kind of feeling can graduate very quickly and get out of hand. However, there is nothing to get alarmed about. We have it under our lens.
