Yet again in the amnesic country, security is the buzz word after the 26/11 carnage in Mumbai. The terrorists’ maritime trail has brought into focus the open sprawl along the country’s 7,500 km coastline. The vulnerable maritime zones across nine coastal states reflect a sordid saga of apathy and neglect.
Around the world, there are 46,000 merchant ships and 4,000 ports in addition to innumerable boats, crafts and trawlers, indicating the enormous extent of security and surveillance required in the whole spectrum of domestic and international maritime activities. Ingenuity and audaciousness of hijackers, pirates and terrorists are infinite. As the torpedo attack of the French VLCC MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen in October 2002 alarmed the shipping world, a chemical tanker, the Dewi Madrim off the coast of Sumatra, was boarded in March 2003 by ten pirates from a speedboat, armed with machine guns and machetes, and carrying VHF radios. The southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro found a stowaway in a container fitted with a bed, toilet, heater and water, also a laptop, mobile and satellite phone, airport security passes and a mechanic’s certificate for several US airports! Some criminals even steal a ship and sell its cargo — then repaint it, and equip it with false documents. There is evidence of terrorists learning about diving with a view to attacking ships from below.
South Asia and its eastern neighbours depend on the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean for their foreign trade, especially for their energy imports from West Asia, thus highlighting the vulnerability of these Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Half of world’s containerised fleet, a third of its bulk cargo, and two-thirds of oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean. Piracy continues to be a problem in southeast Asia, especially in Indonesian waters and along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore Straits. Today, the scene is ever more complicated by the clandestine supply of arms and trade in narcotics — a deadly mix of narco-terrorism.
The country’s establishment is currently dusting the 2001 post-Kargil report on border management in which the Group of Ministers recommended an apex body to be set up for the management of maritime security. Some of the proposals now drafted anew suggest the navy assume overall responsibility for maritime and offshore defence, and the Coast Guard the sole authority for coastal security. The Coast Guard operates what constitutes the exclusive economic zone, between 12 and 200 nautical miles, whereas the marine police exercise surveillance inside the 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, and the Navy beyond 200 nautical miles.
Along with biometric identity cards for fishermen, a mandatory registration of all fishing boats has been proposed. A Rs 6,800 crore plan visualises a special 1,000-strong Sagar Prahari Bal together with 80 fast boats for protection of naval assets and other vital coastal installations. The plan includes the establishment of a Coastal Command and a Maritime Security Advisory Board, with nine additional Coast Guard stations, a static radar and an AIS (automatic identification system) chain all along the shoreline. The Rs 100 crore AIS transponders are proposed for some 300,000 crafts below 300 tonnes. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) prescribes transponders for vessels over 300 tonnes.
Measures initiated in the US immediately following the 9/11 attacks hold a good lesson. ‘Business as usual’ has changed dramatically for port authorities. The US Coast Guard acted to protect the nation’s ports. A series of steps for strengthening maritime security was taken by the IMO in December 2002, including changes in the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS). On July 1, 2004, the amended SOLAS and the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code became mandatory for all member states.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created a new Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), 2002 amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to ensure greater security for the 360 sea and river ports in the US and allied facilities. Among numerous security measures concerning the control of cargo stuffed in containers, for example, a non-intrusive examination rather than physical inspection was advocated. Port security efforts were further extended with the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism and Port Security Act, 2003. The C-TPAT (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism) established partnerships with shippers, carriers, logistics operators and manufactures to improve security along the entire supply chain.
Almost 90 per cent of all freight is transported in containers, over 300 million of which move annually among the world ports. The CSI (Container Security Initiative) introduced in January 2002 aimed at preventing terrorists from concealing personnel or weapons in US-bound cargo. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), 2006, inter alia, requires the 22 largest ports, which handle 98 per cent of all cargo coming into the US, to scan all containers through the use of radiation detectors.
Because containers travel by sea, road and rail, their regulation is particularly problematic. The container may be subject to IMO regulations when on ship; on land, national governments may impose a different set of legislation; a ship may be owned in one country, crewed by a national of a second country, and carry the cargo of a third, to a port of the fourth. The interdependence and linkages among different modes call for a coordinated security approach among sectors and modes. Likewise, a cargo of rock phosphate or coal, for example, could well hide a dirty bomb or some other lethal device.
Important gaps in the security regime in the US were evident elsewhere, for example, along the far flung railway networks. Post-9/11, security in the traumatised city of New York was ubiquitous: rifle-carrying National Guard members patrolling the subway, bomb-sniffing dogs cocking an eye at Staten Island, ferry helicopters hovering overhead, while vulnerable targets such as bridges, tunnels, government buildings and synagogues were peppered with checking points, metal detectors and more uniforms. Operation Atlas, the Big Apple’s security plan, costing the New York City $13 million a week, included unseen anti-terror intelligence and much plain-clothes patrolling.
There is a need now recognised that myriad state and central agencies and organisations engaged in security must be duly coordinated. America’s new omnibus 180,000 strong Department of Homeland Security has brought most of the main functions of domestic security under one umbrella. It amalgamated, among others, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (39,500 employees) from Justice, the Coast Guard (43,600) from Transportation, the customs service (21,700) from the Treasury, besides other independent entities like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (5,100).
Implementing security is a management as well as a technical problem. Technology is necessary but not sufficient. Effective security costs money. Again, security is essentially a global activity: many supply chains by their very nature are international. Avoidable restrictions would harm trade, jeopardising jobs and reducing wealth creation. What is important is to observe and enforce simple rules of the game for basic security awareness and compliance. What indeed is of paramount importance is to scrupulously comply with the discipline and regulations and forsake sloppiness or short cuts. The age-old aphorism remains relevant that eternal vigilance is the price paid for liberty and life.
