India needs to re-engineer its politico-military architecture for handling nuclear assets; it cannot be left to the political leadership or the armed forces alone, nor will loose decision making structures do.
The Indian nuclear weapons programme was conceived and brought to fruition by a close-knit group of scientists who were directed by the political leadership, through interfaces built to suit the then prevailing geopolitical environment. A few templates were available off the shelf thanks to declassified documents from USA in particular. Quite obviously these were applied to the Indian model with the specific aim of maintaining total confidentiality.
That the 1974 explosion and the experiment of 1998 were conducted under cover and without attracting the attention of satellites in orbit have been acknowledged by all. The need for confidentiality meant that only a select few serving military officers were kept in the loop. While this served the limited purpose of the day, a larger number of experts from various associated specialisations, more importantly the three wings of the armed forces, inevitably had to be involved in operationalising the weapon.
The armed forces have the inherent capacity to handle storage, preparation, transportation and delivery of a wide variety of weapons. Given the need to audit and refine techniques of weapon handling and safety features, it is natural that the end users, having been brought into the loop at a late stage, would raise important queries on the adhoc mechanism used by the earlier dispensation.
Energising and engineering the whole architecture of the politico-military interface for nuclear asset management needs a complete overhaul along with gaming, simulation and exercises in preparing for nuclear retaliation. The Cold War era helped refine such institutional mechanisms in USA and the Soviet Union. Some of these are recorded for posterity and need to be carefully analysed in the Indian context.
We are confronted by two nuclear powers — China and Pakistan. It is more than likely that the Chinese learnt from their association with the Soviet Union until the late 1950s before they parted company. Much later, to introduce tested and contemporary processes to manage and deploy nuclear weapon assets, they perhaps adopted the strategy of extracting critical information from scores of highly qualified Russian nuclear scientists who were rendered jobless after the break-up. It is also likely that some of the safety and security processes may have been transmitted from China to Pakistan.
In terms of civilian control of the weapon in democratic societies, guidelines derived from the western experience during the Cold War provide some templates to go by. On the other hand, exact processes followed in China and Pakistan would obviously be structured according to their specific needs. For instance, Pakistan under a military dictatorship would have a different command and control structure from that under a democratically elected government. There is speculation on the security and safety of the nuclear inventory and the dominant decision making role assigned to the armed forces of Pakistan.
In this context, the oft-repeated statements from Pakistan’s military and political leadership, including senior diplomats, needs special attention. Irresponsible comments are being made without corroborating available data and facts related to policy formulations on the use of the Indian nuclear weapon. The statements are based on the mobilisation of troops ordered by the Indian government in response to the terrorist attack on our parliament.
It would appear that the Pakistanis, at least some sections of their leadership, are convinced that a nuclear Pakistan acted as a deterrent to aggression by India and hence India under no condition can use her superior conventional force to threaten Pakistan. More recently, the Indian military doctrine of cold start has been interpreted as a provocative stand and they have warned India of the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons to offset the advantage of quick gains, if any, made by India. There is a need to place these arguments in perspective.
First, nuclear weapons are the last resort of a desperate leadership which is completely unaware of the dire consequences of ‘first use’ of such a weapon. Indeed, there will be no victors in such a war. Second, the non-first-use of the weapon enunciated by India is predicated on a massive retaliation, should a nuclear attack be carried out on India. Given the relative size of the two countries, India would survive a possible attack due to its sheer geographic spread and the soon-to-be-acquired triad capability. But Pakistan could well be wiped out as a country.
Third, the assumption that India’s patience to absorb repeated terrorist attacks sponsored by state/non-state actors in Pakistan is infinite may need reconsideration. India has not abandoned its options to use conventional forces for punitive raids across its borders. Arguably, institutional mechanisms developed over decades of democratic governance may have found insufficient objectives to pursue war as the only option. Such conclusions may not necessarily be repeated under grave provocation.
There is little doubt that all authorities connected with nuclear policy formulations in both our countries need to be exposed to nuances and consequences of a nuclear confrontation. The political leadership needs to be exposed to weapon realities on a regular basis. The US President reportedly goes through drills to aid in decision making of such a complex nature. No longer can we remain complacent about the ability of the political leadership in the sub-continent to decide the options without ensuring that they have the skills to handle such a situation.
In the South Asian context the biggest challenge may well lie in the ability to prepare in peacetime so that there is less bleeding in war. It cannot be left only to the military to prepare for such eventualities. The current approach, ipso facto, assumes that the collective wisdom of the politico-military interface would succeed even without intense preparation in peace time.
A nuclearised country such as ours cannot afford to have loose structures of decision making. Integrating the armed forces is necessary to ensure a single operational authority reporting to the prime minister. Similarly, integrating the armed forces with the ministry of defence is bound to enhance the interaction with the political leadership and consequently, contribute to mutual trust and enhancement of operational effectiveness of our assets.
The politico-military interface needs to be addressed much more meaningfully than we have done so far. It is time to shed our ostrich-like mentality. The foregoing also underlines the need for India and Pakistan to expedite the process of bringing conventional and nuclear CBMs to the table without further delay.
The author is a retired Vice Admiral of the Indian Navy
