Echoing his famous remark on the new foundations of India-US partnership in his celebrated address to the joint session of the US Congress in July 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC last week: “The edifice of the India-US partnership is founded on many pillars. It is a relationship based on pragmatism and principle; and strengthened by shared values and common interests.”
Everyone is familiar with the shared “principles” and “values” that underpin the relationship between the world’s largest and oldest democracies. But few have spelt out what the “common interests” are and what “pragmatic” considerations now define a new relationship.
Indian leaders have been eloquent about India’s pragmatic considerations in seeking US friendship and help, but have shied away from stating what practical things India can do for the US in return. And that is the question that US President Barack Obama wants answered before wrapping up the nuclear deal.
Look at the partnership from an American perspective. No one did this better for me than former US ambassador to India Robert Blackwill. Sitting under a blue sky in Aspen, Colorado, circa 2001, Bob Blackwill shot a question: “India wants the US to invest, India wants the US to keep its markets more open, India wants more visas for its professionals, India wants us to be helpful on Kashmir and in dealing with Pakistan, India wants US support for membership of the UN Security Council, India wants this and India wants that. Tell me what will India give in return?”
So, what would America want that India can give, I asked Ambassador Blackwill. He thought then that sending Indian troops to Iraq would be a good idea. The Vajpayee government considered that possibility and decided it was not such a good idea. India offered, instead, to help in Afghanistan but the US has never been keen, given Pakistani sensitivities.
So, why did former US President George Bush Jr. not bother with the Blackwill question and go ahead and “give” India the civil nuclear agreement? What did he expect in return? He got a lot of love from most Indians, but that’s all. So, why did he do it for India? There are, of course, several theories, ranging from his genuine fear about rising oil prices to his desire to build bridges with India in an increasingly hostile world. Moreover, Bush and his advisors were more prone to taking ideological positions and so may have been persuaded by the view that a rising democratic, plural and secular India would be a bulwark against Islamic extremism and Chinese assertiveness in Asia.
Whatever Mr Bush’s reasons, the more “pragmatic” democrats were not easily persuaded. Recall the Clintons, husband and wife, were always softer on China than India, even if they preferred tandoori chicken to chicken chow mien, and they and Mr Obama were surrounded by what strategic affairs guru K Subrahmanyam once colourfully dubbed as the “ayatollahs of nuclear non-proliferation”. They were livid with the Bush brigade for giving away so much to India on the nuclear deal that sooner or later they were bound to come back with a bill to be paid for.
The Obama administration’s reticence in giving more on the nuclear deal, even if it means holding up business opportunities for American firms, is entirely understandable given the influence of the non-pro lobby, and the pro-China lobby, in the Democratic Party and Obama administration. Indeed, it is for this reason that Dr Singh ran to complete the 123 Agreement and secure the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group before President Bush became lame duck.
Rejecting advice from most of his advisors and party colleagues, who thought the nuclear agreement could be wrapped up after elections in India and the US, Dr Singh chose to go for all or nothing in the summer of 2008. The turning point actually came in February 2008, five months after Dr Singh made that famous remark about his not being a “single issue government”. Everyone took those remarks in late 2007 to mean a retreat by the prime minister from the “take it or leave it” ultimatum to the Left in August 2007.
It was the visit in late February 2008 of Democrats Joe Biden and John Kerry that stirred Dr Singh back into action. The two warned Dr Singh that he better wrap up the deal with President Bush because a Democrat President was unlikely to do so. In the event, their advice was timely. Mr Biden and Mr Kerry were heard with regard because it was known by then that the two would be important officials of a future Democratic administration. Little did anyone imagine Mr Biden would be vice president!
Mr Biden and Mr Kerry had clearly liberated themselves from the ideological stranglehold of the India-baiting non-pro ayatollahs, but Mr Obama has some way to go. More importantly, he and his administration clearly believe India has some IOUs to discharge before the nuclear agreement is operationalised. It is not just the Ts waiting to be crossed and the Is waiting to be dotted, as the prime minister put it, that came in the way of a final wrapping up of the nuclear deal. The non-pro ayatollahs and their Indian counterparts, our own matthadhipathis and dwarapalakas, have not been able to find a way of encashing those IOUs.
The question waiting to be answered is that old Bob Blackwill one from way back in 2001. What can and will India give in return? Here even the Republicans may side with Mr Obama. The US wants to know what India can bring to the table in return for all the things it seeks. Eleven years after former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee first described the two countries as “natural allies”, President Obama echoed the thought last week. But does India of today see itself as a US “ally” or just a “partner”? Clearly, the US wants to know, and is willing to wait before taking the next steps in an evolving strategic partnership.
