Shankar Acharya: Foreign Policy: Mid-Term Report

A PIECE OF MY MIND

Last month (Business Standard, August 22) I offered a somewhat rigorous assessment of the UPA government's economic policies over the past two and a half years. Someone (in the PMO) asked whether I am ever complimentary to this government's policies. My answer is: of course, whenever the policies merit commendation. In foreign policy they certainly do. Indeed, I would rate the government's foreign policy record as outstanding (if you want marks, a clear 80 per cent, maybe higher). Let me elaborate.

What should be the framework of assessment? Well, as a rising "middle power" with fairly serious long-term potential for a truly global role, India's current foreign policy priorities should be reasonably clear: strengthen strategic and economic ties with the world's sole super power (while avoiding the Blairite fate of a "yankee poodle"); improve relations with the rapidly ascending global power north of the Himalayas; pursue a delicate mix of amity and containment with nuclear-tipped and antagonistic Pakistan; deploy economic and political assets to promote peace and prosperity in South Asia; nurture the militarily significant and historically important ties with Eurasian Russia; foster good economic and political relations with other significant middle powers such as the "Big Three" in Europe, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN in Asia, and Brazil and Mexico in Latin America; and seek energy security wherever possible.

Measured against this agenda, the UPA government has done very well. The strategic rapprochement with the US, launched so effectively by the predecessor NDA government, has been taken to a higher level. The pivotal "nuclear deal" still hangs in the balance (of the US Congressional process and subsequent follow through), but to have got this far is quite an achievement for both sides, given the complexity of the issues and the thicket of cross-cutting interest groups and political alignments operating in both countries. On Pakistan too, Vajpayee may have taken the initial risks (and suffered the "Kargil betrayal") but Manmohan Singh has also not hesitated to walk the mine-strewn path towards peace and normalisation with Pakistan. Whether his efforts can surmount the vested interest of large sections of the Pakistani state apparatus in a hostile stance towards India (not to mention the Indian political minefields of any compromise on Kashmir) remains to be seen. But high marks for trying.

Quiet diplomacy (again building on earlier initiatives) has kept the old border dispute with China from getting in the way of rapidly growing trade and investment between the two countries. High-level diplomacy has also nurtured Indo-Japanese relations away from the post-nuclear-tests freeze of 1998 to greener pastures and this healthy trend is likely to be reinforced by the next Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe. The political and defence-related ties with a resurgent Russia continue to be strong, though obviously not at pre-1990 levels. In the South Asian neighbourhood, Indian diplomacy contributed effectively to diffusing the recent Nepal crisis, with significant (and uncharacteristic) help from the Left. In Sri Lanka, our policy has steadfastly supported the government of the day (and deepened bilateral economic ties), while gently encouraging a federal compromise with the secessionist LTTE. However, better relations with Bangladesh remain thwarted by the "tribal" politics of that country and the unfortunate rise of fundamentalist forces. More generally, Indian policy has kicked the old habit of unproductive posturing on every international issue in preference for a more selective and focused pursuit of priority national interests.

What explains the contrast between the government's consummate conduct of foreign policy and its weak record on economic policy? You might have expected the opposite with a world-class economist as Prime Minister. There are several reasons. First, the Prime Minister has demonstrated exceptional (and unexpected) talent at personal diplomacy. His superior intelligence, dignity, sincerity and quiet humility have been very effective with his counterpart leaders. Unlike several of his predecessors, he actually listens to his interlocutors and engages effectively in substantive discussions. He masters his briefs but is not imprisoned by them. When you think about it, we probably haven't had such a personable and wise conductor of prime ministerial dialogue with foreign leaders since Nehru. (No, I am not looking for a job with the PMO!) Indira Gandhi's unpredictable switches from charm to chill often disconcerted counterparts. Rajiv Gandhi's youthful enthusiasm and charm were infectious but, unlike Manmohan Singh, he did not always leave a lasting impression of great wisdom. And, in this domain, the other predecessors were just not in the same league, however powerful and politically popular they may have been.

Second, India happens to be in "a sweet spot" in the evolution of geopolitics. The combination of a quarter of a century of economic growth at 6 per cent a year, demonstrated nuclear capability and a billion-plus population has at last made the country a non-trivial player in the global sweepstakes. The unprecedented surge of China's economic and political power has encouraged quite a few countries to look for explicit or implicit counterweights in global realpolitik. For some, India seems to fit the bill. Third, unlike domestic economic policy, which is all too often held hostage to the interplay of ideologies, entrenched interests and shifting political alliances, the conduct of foreign policy is mostly left to the professionals, with political guidance from the Prime Minister, the foreign minister (when we have one) and, of course, Sonia Gandhi. Exceptions are there, of course, such as Pakistan (always) and one-off issues like the US-India nuclear deal, when everybody (and their aunt!) gets into the fray. But these are exceptions, which the Prime Minister and his national security establishment have handled with much skill ... thus far.

Finally, the UPA government has been fortunate in having Shyam Saran to oversee the MEA establishment during this period (no, he is not a personal buddy). By nearly all accounts, he has handled the varied challenges of foreign secretary-ship (ranging from being the point man on the nuclear deal with the US to handling the occasional delinquent envoy in some distant land) with much intelligence, aplomb and professionalism. (There must have been rather special and peculiar challenges when his minister slipped on an oil slick a year ago and "went ballistic" on national TV.) Nor has Saran fallen prey to the temptation of seeking personal publicity, giving interviews only when the occasion really required it. It's a pity he couldn't be persuaded to stay on for a year, especially since that might have avoided the patent unhappiness of senior IFS officers caused by the transition to the indubitably able (but not quite so senior) Shiv Shankar Menon.

In closing, and to paraphrase the title of a recent hit movie, good night Shyam and good luck Shankar!

The author is Honorary Professor at ICRIER and former Chief Economic Adviser to the Government of India. The views expressed are personal.