The secrecy surrounding the ongoing deliberations on the yet-to-be-inked US-Afghan Strategic Partnership deal is causing considerable disquiet both within and outside Afghanistan. At the same time, the deal meant to be a ‘security guarantee’ for the Afghans seems to be mired in the emerging differences on the conditionalities and nature of the partnership between the US and Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the current state of discussions, once finalised, the strategic partnership will have long-term implications both for Afghanistan and the region.
The officials of the two countries are locked in intense discussions for finalising details of the agreement that would pave the way for retention of US troops in the range of 20,000-30,000 in the country beyond 2014. These troops, based in at least five bases in Afghanistan for the next two or three decades, would conduct specialised counter terrorism operations and provide secondary support to the Afghan forces.
The deal is being discussed in the backdrop of the announcement of a drawdown and a rising wave of Taliban violence. More than 1,400 Afghan civilians have been killed in the conflict till June this year. Further, the targeted killings of President Hamid Karzai’s half-brother Ahmed Wali Karzai and presidential aide Jan Mohammed Khan, both powerful warlords, and the Mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haider Hamidi, have created a power vacuum in southern Afghanistan and have considerably eroded President Karzai’s support base among the Pushtuns — both ominous signs when a transition process of passing on security from NATO to Afghan hands has begun.
Even with all its shortcomings, the US presence remains a crucial security guarantee for the country. President Karzai and senior officials see an enduring American presence and broader strategic relationship as essential, in part to protect Afghanistan from the onslaught of the insurgency and its meddlesome neighbours, but also for the survival of the present regime. However, the Afghans' demonstration of independence, intended to blunt domestic opposition and regional suspicion, is noteworthy.
They have rejected the first draft prepared by the US in its entirety, making it clear that Afghanistan will sign a long-term deal only if the US meets the following conditions: (a) foreign troops should work within the Afghan legal framework; (b) they should not take prisoners or conduct night raids; (c) they must not own private prisons; (d) they have to equip the Afghan air force with F-16 fighter jets and Abrams tanks; and (e) US troops cannot launch operations outside Afghanistan from these bases, thus precluding the possibility of Abbottabad-type of raids that killed Osama bin Laden.
It is unlikely that all these conditions would be acceptable to the US. In dealing with the contentious issues, the US seems caught between making the deal appear as a ‘strategic declaration’ and a long-term binding agreement. The US wants a formal binding agreement, but as things are evolving, they seem content to make a strategic declaration for the present, mainly to signal to the regional powers and the Taliban that they are here to stay. Hence, the US was keen on finalising the deal before the announcement of a drawdown on June 22, 2011.
The US has postured publicly, downplaying the possibility of establishing permanent bases in Afghanistan or keeping its troops there beyond 2014. Such a position is understandable keeping mind US domestic opposition to the Afghan war and the impediment to the reconciliation process with the Taliban. The Taliban wants the US to leave lock, stock and barrel as a precondition for negotiation. But at the same time, the US in return intends to use the deal as a bargaining tool for effective and better governance, control over corruption, development of a system of accountability and larger political sector reform.
It’s indeed a Catch-22 situation for the Afghans. During discussions in June this year in Kabul, the Afghan officials pointed out the utility of the Strategic Partnership deal and, at the same time, were concerned about the long-term US presence in the country. The deal is crucial, for it will ensure the safety of Afghanistan even after the majority of the US troops pull out. At the same time, there are also apprehensions that the foreign forces will eternally occupy Afghanistan. Such fears have been articulated by close advisers of President Karzai from parties like Hizb-e-Islami, with close connections with Iran.
Fears of a permanent American presence have been articulated by neighbouring countries like Iran, Russia and China. While Iran and Pakistan are seen to be moving closer, China is watching developments with some concern. While for the US, the proposed bases are viewed as ‘strategic assets’ in the heart of one of the most unstable regions in the world, bordering not just Pakistan, Iran and China, but Central Asia as well as the Persian Gulf, none of these countries sees the long-term presence in Afghanistan favourably. This could lead these countries to continue their support for proxies, to raise the ante for the US.
Much of Karzai’s bargaining capacity remains intrinsically linked to the performance of the Afghan forces against the Taliban in the areas that have passed under their control. If the Taliban is seen to be gaining in its violent campaign of intimidation and retribution, the President might have to accept the deal on Washington’s terms.
The author is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. She can be reached at shanthied@gmail.com
