T C A Srinivasa-Raghavan: So what has changed, Mr Bush?

OKONOMOS

Substitute nuclear for military and see. Nothing much.

The Net has enabled us all to become researchers. Last week, faintly recalling the name from my school days, I typed Duncan Sandys and Kashmir in Google. The result was the reference given at the bottom of this article.

I urge everyone to download it and read it in full, for I can only summarise it here. The reward, I assure you, is worth the effort.

Duncan Sandys was the Englishman sent along with the American Averill Harriman to read out the riot act to India in 1962, just after it had been walloped by China and was pleading with the US for military assistance.

What happened next is what the document tells us.

It says, "India had little recourse but to turn to the West for support and if handled properly, the conflict could lead to India's alignment with the West."

In the meantime, however, on November 21, the Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire. Sandys and Harriman arrived in India on November 22. Harriman, says the document, conveyed a blunt message to Nehru.

"In a private meeting with Nehru, Harriman stated that unless tensions over Kashmir eased, the United States could not continue to provide military assistance... Nehru reluctantly agreed to negotiations but warned that Indian public opinion would not stand for significant concessions to Pakistan over Kashmir."

Aware of Pakistan's likely tantrum, "Kennedy instructed Harriman to impress upon Ayub that the Sino-Indian confrontation could open a one-time opportunity to bring about reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Ayub accepted the proposal for negotiations."

But he also told the American that "military aid to India to be made contingent upon progress" on Kashmir. Kennedy then approved a military assistance programme for India of up to $60 million.

In December 1962, "Kennedy wrote to Ayub that although the military assistance would not be tied to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, one-sided intransigence [italics mine] would be a factor in determining the extent and pace of the assistance." Ayub then agreed to allow assistance if this could be adhered to.

The US then orchestrated six rounds of talks between December 26, 1962, and May 16, 1963 between Swaran Singh who was the minister for railways and Bhutto, the Pakistani foreign minister.

Why the railway minister, you may ask. Because Nehru had already decided that he could not discuss Kashmir with Pakistan and Swaran Singh was a master staller. The ploy worked.

Thanks to Swaran Singh, the US soon realised that the talks were not getting anywhere and he instructed his advisers, in (Dean) Rusk's words, "to wade into the effort from their ankles up to their knees."

Rusk and Sandys met Nehru and Ayub and managed to convince them to explore the possibility of mediation. This effort also got nowhere.

Ayub "insisted that military assistance to India be tied to a Kashmir settlement and warned that anything more than the limited assistance previously contemplated would have an adverse effect on the alliance."

The document says, "Frustrated by the lack of any progress on Kashmir, Kennedy decided to go forward with a program of substantial military assistance to India, despite the possible impact on US-Pakistan relations... and said 'Let's not be penny wise about India; let's not let them get into a position where they feel that they can't cope with the Chicoms and Paks on top of their other problems'."

So Ayub turned to China and, "in Washington, where China had begun to supplant the Soviet Union as the principal Communist menace, Pakistan's flirtation was seen as tantamount to consorting with the enemy."

Kennedy then sent George Ball to see Ayub who was told that "Pakistan could rely on US help in the event of an attack from India."

Then he said "an adjustment of policies on both sides" was essential and that the US would conduct a "very close reexamination" of current US-Pakistani relations.

Ayub responded by inviting Chou En-lai for a state visit.

Kennedy then told Bhutto he was worried but got "no closer to his objective of building closer ties with India without undermining the alliance with Pakistan."

But, by December 1963, Lyndon B Johnson had become President. He was given a proposal that said India could get $50-$60 million per year in military assistance for five years provided it agreed to: "limit force goals; hold down procurement from the Soviet Bloc; hold to a minimum diversion of foreign exchange from economic development; exercise restraint in relations with Pakistan; and cooperate with us in the containment of Communist China."

The more things change, it seems, the more they stay the same.

Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963: Vol. XIX, South Asia US Department of State, FRUS,
Vol. XIX, 1961-1963, South Asia, Office of the Historian.
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/summaries/960820_FRUS_XIX_1961-63.html