In many ways, Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been good for Turkey. Ever since it came to power in 2002, the Turkish economy has grown quickly: average per capita income increased from $2,800 in 2001 to $10,000 in 2011; foreign direct investment expanded; and access to healthcare and housing improved. Far from being the "sick man of Europe" of the early 20th century, Turkey is among the healthiest countries in the region. The AKP has won three consecutive victories, the last one with nearly 50 per cent of the vote. It remained immune to the brief Arab Spring of popular protest that spread through North Africa and West Asia. Indeed, Turkey was hailed a beacon of "moderate Islamist" governance in a turbulent sea of religious and military autocracies.
Now, ironically, Mr Erdogan and his government are being branded a civilian dictatorship by their domestic opponents. Popular feeling on this issue is running so high that overblown similarities with the Arab Spring are being made. A local protest against the demolition of an Istanbul park to make way for an "Ottoman style" shopping centre has expanded into a countrywide protest against Mr Erdogan's government. Judging from the violence of the crackdown in Taksim Square - reports say over 1,000 people were injured in Tuesday's police operations involving tear gas and rubber bullets - the government is clearly worried. And worse, questions are now being asked whether the modern form of political Islam that Mr Erdogan was trying to establish can be as successful as earlier claimed.
Despite his impressive economic performance, there has in fact been festering discomfort within liberal opinion at the growing de-secularisation with each electoral victory. From 2006 onwards, for instance, the AKP sought to lift the ban on wearing headscarves in schools and colleges, end discrimination against graduates from Islamic schools, criminalise adultery and restrict alcohol sale. All this was compounded by appointing conservative bureaucrats and then the notably devout Abdullah Gul as president, a ceremonial post considered a bastion of secularism. This precipitated a face-off with the powerful and aggressively secular military that ended with the AKP returning with a bigger mandate. A narrow constitutional victory has strengthened Mr Erdogan's hands - and, many think, his Islamic agenda. That is the real message from Taksim Square: a battle between religion and modernisation familiar from Turkey's post-1830s history. Kemal Ataturk's radical programme of westernisation dragged the truncated Ottoman Empire into the 20th century but since it benefited a minority (the business community and the army), he left a legacy of conservative discontent. The AKP's project is caught between these same forces. The lessons are universal, though: religious identity may bring in the votes, but it can never be a proxy for enlightened governance.
