When specialists quarrel, laymen are often left clueless as to who is talking sense. In the belated controversy about whether India’s testing of a fusion (hydrogen) bomb in 1998 was a success or failure, one former nuclear expert from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is ranged against virtually the entire atomic energy establishment. If one applies common sense, though, it would seem that K Santhanam of the DRDO has scored the goals so far. He has asserted that a failure report on the fusion bomb was filed in 1998 itself, within months of the test being conducted—a fact that can easily be verified. He has argued that the usual peer review by independent experts has not been done, to verify the claims of those in office who conducted the test—again something that can be verified. He has given some graphic details of the test result (no big crater at the test site, for instance—for which photographic evidence must exist), and defended the testing measurements that he oversaw. He has questioned the technical knowledge base of his critics (an easy goal to score, since neither APJ Abdul Kalam nor MK Narayanan is a nuclear scientist). And, of course, he has the weight of international scientific opinion on his side.
While no final judgment can be made on the subject so long as the atomic energy establishment continues to swear by what it has been saying for 11 years, the question must be asked: what if Mr Santhanam is right? He argues, for instance, that pressure is going to mount on India all over again to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and that India therefore has a narrow window of opportunity to test a fusion bomb once more so that weaponisation can proceed with full confidence in the designs and equipment being used. He also asserts that true nuclear deterrence does not exist without a hydrogen bomb positioned at the top of a long-range missile like the Agni.
These are questionable positions. The advantages of repeat testing must be weighed against the costs that will be incurred through such an action. As for the gains from fresh testing, they are only a question of degree. After all, no one believes that Pakistan has not acquired nuclear deterrence because it does not possess a hydrogen bomb. The Agni is a massive threat, even with only a fission (atomic) bomb as its warhead. Yes, pressure can and probably will be brought on India to sign the CTBT, but surely the country is strong enough to withstand such pressure. In any case, if it all gets to be too much and the world does not leave India to decide its own defence priorities, that is when the country should test the fusion bomb again as a suitable brush-off, but not until then.
