The Trump administration's move to suspend its security aid to Pakistan offers opportunities for the US to advance its interests in South Asia, according to a former national security council official.
This includes reducing US "reputational exposure" to Pakistan; minimising security assistance as a mutual irritant in the relationship; signalling US' seriousness to India and China; stepping up pressure for action against the Haqqani Network; and presaging tougher policy action in other domains.
"Securing even these modest gains depends on the administrations ability to carry out a more disciplined policy process and messaging campaign, carefully manage risks to the US mission in Afghanistan, and adopt a public posture that does not undermine those Pakistani elites who are trying to use this moment to spark a debate about Pakistans own choices and the future it is making for itself," said Joshua T White, who served as director for South Asian affairs at the National Security Council in the Obama administration.
White is currently a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy programme at the Brookings Institution.
In a policy paper released by the Brookings Institute, White said it is unrealistic to expect that pressure on Pakistan can serve as the primary policy fulcrum for shifting the balance of power in Afghanistan.
Critics, he said, have argued that the decision was poorly executed and will prove insufficient to change Pakistans "strategic calculus" toward its neighbors.
These critiques, while persuasive, may overestimate what the administration intended to achieve from the announcement and underestimate its willingness to pursue a longer game in South Asia, he said.
According to White, securing even modest gains is far from guaranteed. It depends on the administrations ability to manage a disciplined policy process and messaging campaign.
The January announcement raised real questions about whether this is possible under a president who relishes political disruption, he said.
If, on one hand, President Trumps brash rhetoric becomes a recurring feature in the relationship, it will close off space for any practical cooperation or real concessions by Pakistan, the former Obama administration official argued.
If, on the other hand, various departments within the US government feel that they have a free hand to subtly countermand the president's guidance (the Defense Departments public messaging has been notably muddled) it may diminish any wider value that might be found in the security assistance decision, he said.
White said realising these gains also requires that the US carefully manage risks to its mission in Afghanistan.
"Were Pakistan to cut off ground or air lines of communication, US defense planners would scramble to secure alternate routeseach of which would almost certainly be considerably more expensive, or more restrictive, than the current access that Pakistan permits," he said.
Trump likely began laying the groundwork for alternatives through Central Asia when he spoke with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in December and hosted Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the White House in January, he noted.
The administration, he said, also ought to be realistic about the ways in which taking a tougher line with Islamabad might complicate its own larger political objective in Afghanistan by disincentivizing Pakistans efforts however flawed to bring the Taliban to the peace table.
In the policy paper, White argues that the success of any incremental strategy will depend in part on the administration's ability to demonstrate that it wants to retain open channels to understand and, as appropriate, address Pakistans legitimate political, security, and economic concerns in the region.
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