Li Pengs rallying tour of South-east Asia and heightened Ame-rican mischief over Kashmir, testify to the credo of an age in which the pursuit of wealth is the highest form of statecraft. Peace and security are functions of trade and investment; democracy, exalted in India as an end in itself, is a spin-off of the gross domestic product.
Two years ago, Stephen Solarz, then United States ambassador-designate to India, told a public meeting in Singapore, that Washington still recognised Maharaja Hari Singhs instrument of accession. But recent comments by George Pickart, the State Department South Asia bureaus senior adviser, indicate that Kashmir is seen as disputed territory that is not only not part of India, but whose future must take into account the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Independence is not ruled out; the Americans also equate India with a Pakistan, that is one-eight her size and has one-seventh the population.
The explanation for the absurdity is self-evident. If the promise of the 1991 reforms had been fulfilled; if last years foreign investment had been $12 billion instead of $2 billion; if India had surged forward with new industries new jobs; and Bangalores computer revolution repeated all over the country, the Americans would have been singing a different tune. Talks of a Clinton visit indicates that the US is still not writing off a country that is probably capable of assembling the nuclear bomb, whose million or so children in the US have the highest average incomes of any ethnic group in that country, and whose potential as a centre of power still worries the West.
The clincher is commercial, as Michael Mandelbaum, professor at the Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies, wrote in an independence day assessment of US-India ties: If these recent economic trends continue, by the third decade of the next century, when India will surpass China as the worlds most populous country, it could also rival China as a market for American products.
The importance of the profit motive in American diplomacy is highlighted by concern over Indonesias recent decision to buy 12 Russian Sukhoi jet fighters and eight Mi-17 military helicopters. Criticism in the US Congress of Jakartas actions in East Timor and influence-peddling in Washington by Indonesian conglomerates, and Bill Clintons bungled plan to sell the Indonesians nine of the F-16 fighter aircraft destined for Pakistan are blamed for alienating a country that has half the population and more than half the resources of the Asean. Suhartos withdrawal from the US International Military Education and Training programme provided further evidence of ham-handed diplomacy that is costing the US revenue as well as influence.
Into this gap steps the prime minister of a country whose goal, say Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro in their book The Coming Conflict with China, is to replace the US as the pre-eminent power in Asia. Though Li spoke fervently in Kuala Lumpur, his first port of call, against upgraded US-Japanese military cooperation, Chinas weapons are primarily economic. It has already been announced that the Chinese Communist Partys 15th Congress next month, will reaffirm Deng Xiaopings formula of socialism with Chinese characteristics: Zhu Ronji, who will alm-ost certainly succeed Li next year, is the countrys most ardent refo-rmer. It is like appointing P Chidambaram Indias prime minister.
In Singapore, his second halt, Li Peng made it clear that he was addressing the entirety of Asean. That is understandable. Asean is Chinas fifth largest trading partner; last years $20.4 billion turnover being more than three times the 1990 figure. He also stressed the need for infrastructure development, technology transfer, poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and crucial in the wake of the chain effect of the Battle of the Baht measures to strengthen coordination and cooperation in the field of finance and step up exchanges of information to keep each other informed so as to ward off international financial speculation.
As an Asean dialogue partner (like India) China contributed one billion dollars to the International Monetary Funds $16.7 billion bail-out package for Thailand. The Chinese expect the next onslaught to be against the Hong Kong dollar but are convinced that the currency and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority are strong enough to repulse attacks.
Of course, China has disputes with several Asean members. Its maps push Chinas borders into South-east Asian waters and territory. These are tactics with which India is familiar. But whereas in the Himalayas, China advanced on the ground while talking peace at the negotiating table, in South-east Asia China advances at sea while strengthening economic ties. In fact, Chinas acumen received a backhanded compliment from Singapores prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, who confirmed that right next door to the massive Suz-hou industrial park that Singapore is building, the Chinese have set up their own industrial park, which has its own English and Mandarin internet web site, and presents the Singapore enterprise with stiff competition.
That is the way of the world. China may refuse to open its massive telecommunications sector, execute more than 4,500 people, maintain a death grip on Tibet, threaten Taiwan, and muscle in on the Spratly islands, but a sustained nine per cent growth makes it attractive to American businessmen. If India can follow suit, it will find the US prepared again to revive the Pressler Amendments restrictions, dust down the State Department report on Pakistans role in succouring terrorism, and even re-recognise Hari Singhs accession. The clue to India-US relations lies in India.
Voice of America: According to Hong Kongs American-owned Far Eastern Economic Review, while geography may put India in Asia, in terms of economic performance, it has more in common with sub-Saharan Africa. So now we know.
