J N Dixit and his publishers must be dancing a jig. All the way to the bank. When this book went into print, neither of them would have expected it would gain such topicality, what with the furore over the interim report of the commission inquiring into Rajiv Gandhis assassination being tabled in Parliament today. Of course, given the continued ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, the book would have been topical anyway, but the present brouhaha over LTTEs role in Rajiv Gandhis assassination and the links Indian political parties had with the outfit, must have sent its sales soaring.
All those raising Cain over the DMKs links with and assistance to the LTTE would do well to lower their decibel levels. For, this book clearly shows that it was Mrs Gandhi who took the first step in supporting Tamil militants when the AIADMK-led by MGR was ruling in Tamil Nadu. Rajiv Gandhi continued that policy, though he tried to be more impartial than his mother was. Throughout Indias involvement in Sri Lanka, central intelligence agencies assisted the militant groups in every possible way. Yes, the DMK did support the LTTE long after India distanced itself from Sri Lanka, but it had done nothing the intelligence agencies were not doing.
This is an absorbing, candid, blow-by-blow, behind-the-scenes account of Indias Sri Lanka policy between 1983 and 1990, and raises some disturbing questions. Was Indias involvement (or interference, as some would say) a wise decision considering the price the country had to pay for it the IPKF fiasco and the life of a former prime minister? Whats more, the LTTE continues to hover over the Indian horizon and it will be years before the residue of suspicion goes out of Indo-Lankan relations.
There was also a moral issue involved: that of one country meddling in the internal affairs of another. A deed for which India had always put the United States and other western powers in the dock. India seems to have lost more than it gained by its entanglement in Lanka.
Because of all this, its not easy to defend Indias Lanka policy during that period. But, to his credit, Dixit does a commendable and efficient job of it. That, of course, comes from practice during his long stint in the foreign service and the fact that he was actively implementing the policy during his tenure as High Commissioner to Sri Lanka between 1985 and 1989. What is more, his defence seems to come from the heart and he doesnt have any the-morning-after pangs of guilt which seems to afflict many bureaucrats after they retire.
Dixit believes that Indian involvement in Sri Lanka was unavoidable. The post-1983 exodus of Lankan Tamils to Tamil Nadu, where militant bases were set up, and Sri Lankas growing security, economic and intelligence connections with Pakistan, Israel and the US necessitated Indian involvement, according to him. There were also domestic compulsions. India was already battling with secessionist movements in Punjab, Kashmir and the north-east. Conventional wisdom would have dictated a hands-off-Lanka approach precisely for this reason, but there was the issue of Tamil sentiments. Mrs Gandhi, then in power, needed to build a positive equation with MGR. Being seen to be sympathetic to the Tamils was one way of doing this. Neither Mrs Gandhi nor Rajiv Gandhi, however, supported the idea of Eelam, a separate state for Sri Lankan Tamils, Dixit asserts.
An earnest defender of Indias policy he may be, but Dixit is quite frank about where the foreign policy establishment went wrong. An over-arching miscalculation, he says, was underestimating LTTE chief, Prabhakarans passionate, even obsessive, commitment to the cause of Tamil Eelam, his authoritarian and single-minded nature. He admits to his personal failures of judgement too: overestimating Jayewardenes sincerity and influence over India-haters like R Premadasa and Lalith Athulathmudali; the conviction that the LTTE could be bypassed and isolated in the run-up to the Indo-Lanka agreement.
Dixits book gives valuable insight into the human factor in policy-making. He mentions the bad vibes between Mrs Gandhi and Jayewardene which may have hardened positions on both sides. Then there was prime minister R Premadasas churlishness when he kept Narasimha Rao, then external affairs minister, waiting for 20 minutes. Dixit also takes to task former foreign secretary, Romesh Bhandari, who was impatient with Tamil political parties and antagonised them in the process. Bhandaris eagerness to notch up some success before he retired led to a fair amount of abrasiveness on his part.
Dixit also talks about the deep-rooted psychological divide between the Sinhala and Tamil populations in the island and what he calls the minority complex of the majority. It is because he puts his narrative in the context of larger pictures like these that this book gains an edge. Otherwise, it would have been just another boring memoir of a bureaucrat.
Assignment Colombo J N Dixit Konark Publishers Rs 400/393 pages
