It was a lunch that is difficult to forget. A stellar cast represented the Rajiv Gandhi government at the Villa Medici in Delhi's Taj Mahal Hotel: the most powerful officials from the Prime Minister's office, the cabinet office and the ministries of home, defence and external affairs. Also present was the vice-chief of army staff, and the minister of state for external affairs. They were there to brief a handful of journalists -- deep, deep background -- on why India was sending its soldiers to Sri Lanka. It is difficult to believe that this high-powered bunch would be calling such a meeting, to say the things that they were going to say, without the Prime Minister's clearance.
The soldiers had just been sent in, and the air of triumphalism was unmistakeable, as though a war had been won, indeed that a country had been taken over. The questions reflected scepticism, the answers suggested hubris.
Was India not getting involved in someone else's war, and creating its own Vietnam? Sunderji's deputy talked in emotional terms of why, when he looked into the eyes of the Indian soldiers in Jaffna, he knew that that would certainly not be the case. What if the Sri Lankans changed their minds, and the President of the country wanted India's soldiers to leave? The minister from South Block said India would then have to consider its position; in other words, the soldiers would stay, irrespective of Sri Lankan wishes. India was now in charge.
But why was India getting involved? Because if we didn't, the Americans would, and don't forget that if they got control of Trincomalee harbour, they would never leave. Weren't we over-reaching? The most powerful man in the Prime Minister's office gave his own separate answer, that a great country had to be prepared to seize the hour and play its rightful role. Later he would argue that India's elite was not up to the task.
One left the lunch with the feeling that everyone in the government had gone mad. The other subsequent revelations (for instance, that the LTTE's Prabhakaran had to be paid off with Rs 5 crore in order to buy his acquiescence--or so Rajiv's government thoug-ht) only confirmed that whatever strategic thinking was taking place was completely off the mark. The objectives weren't clear, the stated objectives didn't seem to be the undisclosed objective, and the risks that were self-evident to the uninitiated journalist, seem-ed to be well hidden from a government that was blinded by its own cleverness and sense of triumph. Rajiv paid for these grievous mistakes with his life.
There is the inevitable question: how easy or difficult is it in the government to arrive at crazy decisions? PN Dhar, in his recently published memoirs on his years in Indira Gandhi's office, recounts two instances. In one episode, the proposition being debated was that taxes would not be required if the banks were nationalised! And in another, the government was contemplating nationalising Tisco in the run-up to the 1972 elections, because bank nationalisation three years earlier had helped garner votes. He also discloses that Mrs Gandhi was not interested in complicated arguments.
But these are digressions. The immediate issue is Sri Lanka, and the Vajpayee government's reluctance to get involved again militarily is easily understood, and something to be grateful for. But the fact is that India cannot be uninvolved. Back in 1971, when the Bandaranaike government in Colombo was fighting off a dramatic (Chinese-inspired?) insurgency, India chipped in with critical help. Rajiv himself got involved when the Maldives' Gayoom asked for help (remember the dramatic airlift, using IL-76s). And, of course, RAW has been deeply involved with the various Tamil groups since the early 1980s. The extent to which the LTTE had penetrated Tamil Nadu by 1991 suggests that co-operation across the Palk Straits may not always be sanctioned by New Delhi. Finally, there is the old fear that if India doesn't step in, someone else will come into this country's backyard. So, whether one likes it or not, India is involved. And the choices in the months ahead aren't going to be black or white ones, like sending in Indian troops.
